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Purpose of This Study.—The major purpose of this study is to
explore present legislative composition in terms of the principles of
one man-one vote. This writer proposes to investigate factors which
have prevented fair and equitable representation of rural and urban
citizens in state legislatures throughout the United States. He seeks
to examine the issues and facts that produced and perpetuated
imbalances in state legislatures. The imbalances referred to have
existed since the initiation of state legislative assemblies. These
imbalances were and still are ones of representation and district
constituency. There has been a conflict of interest between urban and
rural factions since frontier days. This conflict persists today as a
part of the great controversy concerning legislative representation.
It seems as if agrarian and rural interests have always competed with
urban and suburban interests for dominant influence and control of
state and federal legislatures.
In this thesis, I shall concern myself with the current legisla¬
tive and judicial trends and decisions as they bear upon the issue of
apportionment and state legislatures. This author undertakes the
examination of processes, causes, and effects of reapportionment upon




Scope and Limitations.--This paper shall be concerned with the
exploration of currently popular arguments for and against state legis¬
lative reform and constituency. It shall be mainly centered around
facts, findings and court decisions since 1960 and up until 1965. In
1960, the issue of state legislative apportionment gained wide public
recognition. The court case of Baker v. Carr in 1962 represents a
landmark in progress toward a solution of reapportionment problems.
The first analysis with which this thesis is concerned is the
principle of one man-one vote in terms of a democratic ideal. Justifi¬
cation for its incorporation into the American framework of democracy
is then attempted by defining it according to the United States
Constitution. Once the theory of one man-one vote has been established
as a democratic principle, an analysis of the problem of underrepresen¬
tation of urban areas in state legislatures follows. Included within
this analysis are reasons for the underrepresentation of urban areas.
Two main reasons have accounted for urban underrepresentation in state
legislatures. Those reasons are neglected state constitutional
provisions for reapportionment and the failure of legislators to perform
the duty of reapportionment which their respective state constitutions
have placed upon them.
After the problem has been identified and an analysis of its
reasons given, it seems natural to ask what possible solutions are
open to urbanites to correct these injustices. An attempt to probe
possible solutions, then, is the next concern of this thesis.
The fourth chapter of this thesis deals with progress toward
equality of representation in state legislatures today. This subject
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is approached by reviewing the progress made in light of ultimatums
from the courts.
Chapter V represents some attempted projections about the future
of state legislative politics based on the research within this paper.
The impact of reapportionment on state politics shall be the major
concern. Within this thesis, the writer has endeavored to pick out
pertinent information from reputable sources containing material both
for and against legislative composition and change. From initial
advocacies in favor of change, the writer has inquired into the gamut
of court hearings and decisions to legislatures and their actions and
reactions. Finally, the writer explores the ultimate source of power--
the people.
Deep apprehension causes me to be aware that there are always
some things unsaid or unexplored about and subject matter under
investigation. Out of humility, therefore, the present writer admits
to the existence of such limitations as a part of this study. The very
nature of reapportionment problems are such that they tend to defy
superficial theoretical solutions. No uniform formula has been devised
yet whereby states with inequities may satisfy the "equal protection"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
without great inconveniences.
Methods of Research.—This paper combines the historical method
with the case study method. Also used is the analytical method. The
annals of history are invoked in an attempt to place the problems
involved in the issue of reapportionment of state legislatures within
their proper framework. The tools of logic are then employed for the
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purpose of evaluating our findings from a pragmatic standpoint. A con¬
sideration of the reapportionment litigation explored in this thesis
reveals the case study method which presents a more desirable picture.
Process of Inquiry.--The process of inquiry used by the writer
has been the descriptive analysis technique. This technique consists
of describing and analyzing the pertinent data on the topic under
investigation—reapportionment.
Definitions and Terminology.—Verbal tools employed with this
thesis include the following terms:
Apportionment - The process of subdividing the state
into units for purposes of electing governmental repre¬
sentatives, and facilitating state administration of
legislative and fiscal matters.
District - A subdivision of the state used for purposes
of electing representatives.
Gerrymander - The arbitrary intentional cleavage by the
legislature of geographic state subdivisions so as to
deprive citizen segments of an effective vote; usually
an animal figure is formed picture wise when gerry¬
mandering takes place.
Reapportionment - The process of changing districts to
comply with recent census demands and population shifts
in an effort to equalize the worth of a vote with
respect to living locale.
Citizen - One who possesses the legal right and duty to
participate in and reap the benefits of government
functions and services.
Significance of This Study.—The issue of reapportionment is
currently uppermost in the minds of elected officials. In the fact of
court mandates state and federal representatives have found that the
issue can no longer be avoided. If representative democracy is to
survive, it must be based upon truth and equality in every respect.
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Legislative composition is at the heart of representative democracy.
It is hoped that this study, along with the prolific flow of literature
that already exists, will in some measure illuminate the many different
facets of the issue of reapportionment. This study seeks to stir the
American conscience to awareness and to action in gaining genuine
representative citizen equality. The writer trusts that this study
will help shed light on representational ills of state legislatures.
Thus genuine correction of representation evils is both desirable and
necessary under democracy.
CHAPTER II
THE PRINCIPLE OF ONE MAN-ONE VOTE
The Democratic Ideal.--American democratic theory is based upon
assumptions that all individuals have certain natural rights. These
natural rights are possessed by all individuals as citizens of the
state. Outstanding among these natural rights is political equality
under the law. Thomas Jefferson, one of the chief exponents of demo¬
cratic theory, expounded upon this thesis in the Declaration of
Independence. He decreed that "all men are created equal and'. . .
endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, that among
these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Although the
equality mentioned in Jeffersonian theory has been the source of much
controversy, most authorities agree that only political equality is
capable of being preserved and protected by the state. "Equality of
the ballot" heads the list among those freedoms which comprise
political equality.
In an analysis of the services and functions for which man
instituted government, I find it somewhat difficult to overemphasize
the value and crucial importance of the elective franchise to those
served and affected by government. The right to vote, and delegate
representative quality of spokesmen, affect most profoundly those
represented by delegates to legislatures. I maintain that the right
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to determine who shall represent and broadly to what end is the epitomy
or abyss to which every other right, ultimately, pays homage. Through
the effective use and application of this right, representative democ-
racy--with all of its ills and virtues--has progressed, shaped and
affected the growth and development of man in his political and social
history.
Out of the basic right of representation flows the innumerable
rights, privileges, and restraints of civil government. I do not
pretend that representative democracy is a political panacea. However,
I feel that the utilitarian idea—the greater good for the greater
number—does justice to and illuminates the ideal we defend.
It was firmly established in the case of Wesberry v. Sanders
in an opinion delivered for the court by Mr. Justice Black that the
fundamental principle of representative government in this country is
"equal representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to
race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a state.
The Wesberry case reaffirms and gives voice to a somewhat dormant
concept in our democracy. This concept is voter-representative
equality in all political respects. The ideal of citizen equality or
one man-one vote is the issue at the base of contentions for legisla¬
tive revisions. Exponents of this ideal are pushing for
representational changes of state legislatures in conformity with
recent population shifts. The general aim is the achievement of
political equality for all men regardless of their living locale.
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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In the fight for political equality the Supreme Court proved to
be a definite friend when it held in the Wesberry case that the appor¬
tionment of Congressional seats which:
. . . contracts the value of some votes and expands
that of others is unconstitutional since the Federal
Constitution intended that when qualified voters
elect members of Congress each vote be given as much
weight as any other vote .... The Constitutional
prescription . . . means that as far as is practicable
one man's vote . . . is to be worth as much as
another's.^
The right to legislatively and representatively participate in the
functions of government on an equal basis with every other citizen is
the constitutional right of all United States Citizens. Dilution, con¬
traction, or expansion of the value of some citizens' votes in compari¬
son to others is not constitutionally nor legally justifiable according
to the United States Constitution.
Proponents of citizen equality disagree on the possibility and
the means of achieving totally equitable representation. By totally
equitable representation I mean apportionment of representatives, so
that there is an even ratio of people per representative regardless to
the existing land area of the electoral district involved. Some
authorities do not agree that this type of even ratio can be achieved.
They contend that the physical and geographic nature of districts are
such that they cannot be easily recarved to insure even ratios of
people within.
Again the concept of population is of such a nature that it
^Ibid.
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contains many different categories of people. I mean here, that voters
and non-voters are within the category of the term population. Also
included are many varying age groups and classification. The factor of
variety within the concept of population renders reapportionment on a
strict one to one basis impracticable.
If total representative equality can be agreed upon as a
possible achievement, the problem then becomes one of methodology to
be used in achieving a workable formula for redrawing district lines
that are mutually acceptable by rural and urban political elements. My
feelings toward the democratic ideal propel me to make a conscientious
attempt to develop tentative solutions to current representative crises
in the interest of continuity of representative equality.
Constitutional Justification for the Principle of One Man—
One Vote.—Those who seek constitutional justification for the
principle of one man—one vote find this justification within the
"equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Chief Justice Earl Warren gave the classical
statement of such justification in the majority opinion of Reynolds v.
Sims. Chief Justice Warren argues that the concept of equal protection
of the law requires uniform treatment of all persons that stand in the
O
same relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged.
This means, of course, that since voters are the same regardless of
where they reside, they stand in the same relation to the state legis-
tures; and are thus entitled to equal representation in them in accord
^Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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with citizens from other living locales. If this is denied them, then
the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
abridged. Thus, those voters whose voting power has been unequally
dispensed suffer. Mr. Warren goes on to say that "with respect to the
allocation of legislative representation, all voters as citizens of a
state stand in the same relation regardless of where they live."^
This justification is taken even further when Justice Warren argues
that:
... to the extent that a citizen's right to vote is
debased, he is that much less a citizen. The fact
that an individual lives here or there is not a
legitimate reason for overweighting or diluting the
efficacy of his vote.^
Thus state bureaucratic machinery is bound by the law of the
land to do all that is necessary to guarantee equal protection in the
exercise of one's political, economic, and social rights as a citizen.
No superficial criterion is to be considered before the state imple¬
ments all the machinery necessary for protection of its citizens.
Although many cases may be cited to the contrary, these do not negate
the basic constitutional intent—to provide equal protection for all
citizens without regard for race, origin or geographic location.
The formal provisions of the United States Constitution that
deal with representation in federal government were intended to supple¬
ment the popular will, to make it broadly representative and also




republic and provide security against sudden majorities, or the
dominance of the whole of the polity by the part.
The representative formula in the Constitution taken as a whole
was, of course, a complex one. It set the size of the constituencies
for the House of Representatives and the qualifications of the electors
for the House by reference to the "most numerous branch" of the state
legislatures. It established equal representation of the states and
per capita voting in the Senate. It is reported that James Madison
noted justly so in the debates that preceded the drafting, ratification,
and adoption of the Constitution that the majority must "be rendered,
by their local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect
schemes for oppressions."”
The theory of one man—one vote deserves the status of a
principle in the democratic heritage because of its close connection
with the theory of popular sovereignty. Concepts of majority rule and
minority rights are essential to the theory of popular sovereignty.
Also important is the way by which popular sovereignty is expressed in
a democracy. The legal and official registration of what the people
want takes place through the use of the ballot or vote. Then it
follows that if some people's ballot can be worth more in determining
who shall rule and broadly to what ends, for one reason or another, we
are no longer a democratic country but rather an aristocratic one.
Democracy demands that all the people (legal voters) rule and determine
^David G. Smith, The Convention and the Constitution (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 62.
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the broad course of politics in America. In a democracy some voters
are not to be given privilege status at the expense of others. We are
all endowed with the same inalienable rights.
CHAPTER III
STATE LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT
Underrepresentation of Urban Areas.--The "urban problem" is not
simply one problem, but many. Many metropolitan analysis have stressed
the role of state and federal government in solving our urban problems.
Some contend that states are in the most strategic position, and are
obligated to provide necessary change. On the other hand, state legis¬
latures have, historically, taken less than a sympathetic interest
toward urban problems. This is perhaps the main issue on which the
current flood of court cases rest. Solutions to this political
quagmire involve questions of basic political values. The modification
of political values, by legislatures, has been neglected too long.
Consequently, metropolitan and suburban areas have suffered great
political injustices at the hands of rurally stacked and sentimented
legislatures.
Our national history, in the formative years of our republic,
reveals little or no intentional or systematic attempt to underrepresent
the urban and suburban dwellers. During the formative years of our
nation, in order to determine the representation in the legislature,
the existing subdivisions, counties and townships were usually used as
electoral districts. Ofttimes the most sparsely settled subdivisions
were combined with others in order to make election districts roughly
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equal in population. This has made for physical geographic disparity.
In some states no special conscious effort was made to equally
distribute population; those states were simply carved into a number of
smaller geographic areas with no respect to population. Mitau and Chase
in their book. Proximate Solutions; Case Problems in State and Local
Government, note that:
In 1790, 5.1 percent of the people lived in urban
areas as against 94.9 percent in rural areas. As
late as 1840, only 10.8 percent of the population
lived in urban areas. Surprisingly enough, in
1850, only six cities had a population of over
100,000.1
These cities are identified as New York with a population of approxi¬
mately 515,547; Baltimore with a population of 169,054; Philadelphia
whose population lists as 121,376; New Orleans, the population of which
was listed as 116,376; and Cincinnati with a population of 115,435.^ A
continuing trend of urbanization was noted by Mitau and Chase:
After 1840, the urban areas came to hold an ever-
increasing precentage of the population. By 1927,
a majority of the population of the United States
was centered in urban areas (51.2 percent). Today
that percentage is pressing 75 percent.^
Considering the small minority of states allowing urban popu¬
lations a proportionate voice in their legislatures, Massachusetts is
perhaps closest to the ideal of one man—one vote. In this state
representation is based upon the distribution of legal voters instead
^G. Theodore Mitau and Harold W. Chase, Proximate Solutions:
Case Problems in State and Local Government (New York: Charles




of population. This would appear to be a more sound representational
base since the concept of population includes certain classifications
of people who do not possess the elective franchise. It is the
registered voters who are important to representatives in their attempt
to interpret the needs of the people and thus implement public policy.
It is important to note that cities as well as fast-growing
suburban areas are many times the most severely underrepresented state
constituencies. Political equality and cries for equal representation
went unheard for many decades. To be more precise, until growing
suburban areas recently began to feel the pinch of inadequate represen¬
tation, cities were less than equally represented. The large urban
centers have usually been the targets of unrepresentative legislative
schemes.
Clyde Snider and Samuel Gove emphasize two factors already
mentioned that militate against urban areas as far as underrepresenta¬
tion is concerned. They are: first, constitutional provisions and
second, the failure of legislatures to reapportion as directed by the
Constitution and the United States Supreme Court.^
State constitutions usually stipulate that the legislature
reapportion at specified intervals. Since urban areas grow faster in
population than rural districts, reapportionment is supposed to mean
an increase in the number of members alloted to urban areas and a
decrease in the number of rural representatives. Snyder and Gove
^Clyde F. Snider and Samuel K. Gove, American State and Local
Government (New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, 1965), p. 191.
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observe also:
For a rural representative to . . . vote himself out
of the legislative body, takes, to say the least, con¬
siderable courage. It is therefore not surprising
that rural-controlled legislatures have hesitated to
take action which would weaken rural control over the
legislative body or perhaps transfer that control to
urban areas.5
By examining the ratios of representation in state legislatures,
rural v. urban, it is difficult to reach but one conclusion; that is,
urban centers are and have been proportionally underrepresented in
terms of numbers of citizens within their constituency. Professor
Jewell Cass Phillips has noted that only two states have accorded urban
constituencies equal representation with the rural in both houses of the
legislature. These states are identified as Massachusetts and Wisconsin.
In all other states representational inequities vary from moderate to
severe underrepresentation for urban areas.^ In all except the above-
mentioned two instances, discrimination against urban areas exist in
at least one house of their state legislatures.^ This fact has impor¬
tant implications vdien analyzed in connection with the mainstream of
American politics. In those cases where only one house is unequally
constituted, urban legislation could encounter attitudes just as
hostile as if inequities existed in both houses. Usually one hostile
house is all necessary to defeat a bill started with the best of
^Ibid., p. 192.
^Jewell Cass Phillips, Municipal Government and Administration
in America (New York; The Macmillan Company, 1960), pp. 70-71.
^Ibid.
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intentions in the other house.
Georgia, Florida, Delaware, Maryland, Connecticut, Rhode Island,
New Jersey and California, in that order are eight states that con¬
stitute the group of states with the most severe representative
imbalances; twenty-two states fall into the next category designated
group II in severity of representation imbalances; nine states comprise
group III; and seven states are in group IV. These groups are ordered
from the most severe to the least severe. It is correct to assume the
other four states are in the equal representation category at this
time.
Historically state legislatures have been representatively
slanted to favor rural districts. Legislatures have created counties
and stipulated ways and means of representing those counties. They
have usually representatively favored rural counties at the expense of
urban ones.
Georgia is notable example of this type of situation.
In the lower house each of the 159 counties has one
representative but additional representation is
given to the 38 most populous counties; yet three is
the maximum nximber that any county may have.8
State legislatures have failed, effectively and in good faith,
to deal with the problem of equal representation of citizens without
regard to living locale. Urban and suburban areas have traditionally
been 'representatively penalized' while their rural agrarian counter¬
parts have, on the other hand, been 'representatively rewarded.' This
^Ralph Eisenberg, "Power of Rural Vote," Legislative Apportion¬
ment: Key to Power, ed. Howard Hamilton (New York: Harper and Row
Publishers, 1964), p. 14.
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has seemingly been the trend of legislatures with few exceptions for
quite a lengthy duration. There has been mutual fear and widespread
distrust of both rural and urban factions within legislatures. Fear of
the abuse of power by both parties has been no doubt justified. For
both factions, given the proper circumstances, would have-no-doubt-
weilded power in a somewhat biased fashion with selfish and local
values and interest dictating the quantity, direction and quality of
that power.
With few exceptions rural legislators have been politically
influential in state houses. Small degrees of this trend can even be
seen in our National legislature. Professor Phillips observes that the
following factors are sometimes, by design, responsible for rurally
dominated legislatures.
. . . large taxpaying interests frequently gain from
rural domination and will go to great lengths to
maintain existing apportionments.^
The combined teixpayer associations and rural legislators constitute an
almost unbeatable team in many states. The result of which is often
that few changes occur, in old methods of apportionment and redistricting,
that warrant mentioning. The problematic and political entanglement of
machine politics is what underrepresented areas seek redress from.
This research is intended to point an illuminating beacon in that
direction. Representative change is inevitable. The intensity and
direction of such change is largely dependent upon those who man the
helms of power.
^Phillips, op. cit., p. 70.
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Constitutional Provisions for Reapportionment,—Since consti¬
tutional law is basic law, one would expect to find in it provisions
for all the important aspects of a state's activities. Also since
reapportionment of legislative districts or the periodic readjustment
of citizens' voting power is an important aspect of the state's
activities, an investigation of state constitutional provisions follows.
Law-making is a necessary function of all states. All state
constitutions provide for law-making bodies of some sort. They also
provide for the staffing of these bodies. This thesis revolves around
this point.
States usually divide themselves into legislative districts for
the purpose of choosing representatives to their legislatures. Most
often these districts follow the boundary lines of some other sub¬
division of the state. For example, the county or the town is often
used,. Thus in most states "a typical legislative district consists of
a single county" or a combination of contiguous counties.^® Where a
single county has a population large enough to warrant it more than
one representative, states either authorize at-large elections within
the county, or they apportion the representatives according to
districts within the county. These factors have accounted for the
election of seven Negroe representatives from Atlanta to the Georgia
house. Most states use two separate districts for their upper and
their lower house. However, occasionally a single set of districts
are used for electing members to both houses. Some state constitutions
^^Snider and Gove, op. cit.. p. 188.
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prescribe the boundaries of their legislative districts. By and large,
however, this is a function which most states in their constitutions
confer upon their legislatures.^^ As of January 1962, twelve state
senates had their allocations fixed according to areas by their constitu-
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tions. At this same time three state legislatures had their lower
houses fixed by their constitutions. The states with the lower houses
constitutionally fixed are identified as Delaware, Maryland and Vermont.
The lower houses in the other states are not constitutionally fixed.
The factor most commonly considered since Reynolds v. Sims in
apportioning legislatures is that of population. Some states do
recognize certain other factors. For instance, some exclude aliens for
apportionment purposes. Others apportion members of both houses .on
the basis of the number of voters. Of the 99 separate state legisla¬
tive chambers, 32 use population alone as the basis of representation;
8 use population with weighted ratios; 45 use a combination of popu¬
lation and areas as considerations; 8 use equal representation for each
unit; 1 is based upon state tax payments--New Hampshire's senate; and
5 have fixed constitutional apportionments.^^ The above data and
figures are taken from a 1960 study done by Gordon Baker, since this
study represents the more concise statistical information available on
^^This information is taken from a table compiled by Glendon
Shubert in his anthology on Reapportionment (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1965), p. 67.
^^ordon Baker, State Constitution: Reapportionment (New York:
National Municipal League, 1960), p. 5.
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the subject. This is why it is mentioned in this thesis.
State Constitutions may influence the reapportionment of state
legislatures in at least the following ways; they may affix the scheme
to be used for apportionment within the formal body of the constitution;
they may provide for the job of reapportionment to be done by the
legislature. In this instance the basis of representation is usually
laid down in the constitution; and, the constitution may take into con¬
sideration the "Achillian heel' of the legislature and place the
apportionment duty with an independent commission or administrative
officials. In states that provide for periodic reapportionment or
redistricting, state or federal censuses are usually used as guidelines.
Failure of Legislators to Redistrict.—The failure to systemati¬
cally and equitably reapportion state legislatures has caused widespread
discontent among and within states. The condition still exists whereby
urban legislators, though spokesmen for citizen majorities, continue to
be out-voted by rural legislative majorities who represent rural
minorities. This is due mainly to inequitable representative distri¬
bution practices long since outmoded. One looming political issue of
our times becomes how to adapt state constitutions to make possible
responsible state and local governments for an America that insists on
both 'majority rule' and 'minority rights.'
Few if any political grievances are more justified than those
bearing upon the basic right of equal representation. The author has
already noted that the right to vote or participate in determining who
shall do xdiat—in our behalf--in legislatures is the basic right which
all others are contingent upon. Those who taste power usually derive
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great satisfaction of a cathartic nature. Thus the wielding of power
maintains and extends a quest for more power. The following quote from
the famous British political scientist. Lord Acton, need not necessarily
be true. Yet, my observations seem to indicate that this is the
majority trend among politicians. "Power corrupts, and absolute power
tends to corrupt absolutely." Thus, it has been with legislative con-
stituents-representatives.
Political scientists generally agree that state legislatures
have historically followed a course of rurally favored imbalances, in
terms of equal representation. We find however little or no support
to substantiate the claim that rural interests or representatives
originally and knowingly designed state assemblies with political
partiality. However, it would have been shown to be in their political
interest to do so. In their interest then, they perpetuate and
protect such favorable representative design. This is perhaps the major
current issue of contention between rural and urban factions and their
chosen representatives.
One trend which has deeply influenced the character of American
Government on all levels has been the tendency of the federal govern¬
ment to keep widening the scope of its activities. This practice is
generAlly designated as centralization. There are those who call this
practice octipus-like decentralization. Usually this expansion is at
the expense of the states and their localities. In many cases these
political maneuvers were and are being made simply to carry out
functions that no duly constituted political agency have ever performed
before for various reasons. The incapacity of local and state agencies
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to deal with urgent new problems which have sometimes been reinforced
by the refusal of state legislatures--rurally dominated--who care
little about urban problems, to act even when they could, has caused
federal intervention. This type of inactivity has stimulated the trend
toward widened federal intervention—generally by the courts.
A few of the areas in which the federal government has expanded
its activities within the past decade are: (1) Labor-management
relations, (2) Regulation of utilities and communications media,
(3) Public welfare services, and (4) Solutions to urban and suburban
problems which overlap local borders. The latter area takes 'focal
primacy' in this thesis.
Another factor which has had great influence upon shaping the
state and federal character has been the continued displacement of the
farm population. Great rural population quantities have amalgamated
themselves into urban and suburban areas, thereby further intensifying
their already acute social and political problems. As changes
mentioned above occur the relocated groups take on new interests,
thereby modifying their political designs or desires. Occuring social
displacement causes one to form new social ties, nurture new social
values, and to some degree become a greatly modified political and
social being. According to a recent publication of the Congressional
Quarterly Service, it was reported that the "number of farmers have
been declining throughout most of the 20th century.The farm
^^Legislators and Lobbyists (Washington: Congressional
Quarterly Service, 1965), p. 5.
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population was as high as 23.1 per cent as late as 1940. Figures in
1964 tend to show that the farm population had dropped to 6.8 per cent.^^
State legislatures have traditionally diligently dealt mainly
with political issues or regulations of state sub-divisions other than
themselves. They have been very busy subjecting other state and local
institutions to their respective--state constitutional--regulations and
provisions. So busy, in fact, have they been that they have ignored
the fact that legislators as promulgators of the law are subject to it
just as other citizens. Consequently, legislative bodies have neglected
—by and large—to subject themselves to specified periodic constitu¬
tional constituency modification or reapportionment.
Recent attention has been directed mainly at state legislative
constituency. The major question is: Are they or are they not equally
representative bodies? If there are to be two legislative chambers
with power to check and/or veto the political and legislative maneuvers
of each other, both would represent all citizens of the state (or
Nation) on a "genuine basis" of equality. Today's problem is that the
houses present a distorted mirrow of the population because state
Congressional Districts are of unequal constituency and size. To
leave the veto-wielding upper chamber as is, would in effect, defeat
the intent of legislative representation reform. Equal voter efficacy
is indispensable to stable democratic government. Disparities in the
worth of the vote exist with varying degree in 42 of the 50 states.
The states enjoying equal representation are identified as Alaska,
l^Ibid.
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Delaware, Nevada, Vermont, Wyoming, Hawaii, Alabama and New Mexico.
These states are taken from studies by Andrew Hacker.
Hacker's study points out that Michigan is guilty of the widest
representative vote variances of all the states. The value of the vote
in the smallest district of Michigan is worth 4.5 times that of the
vote in the largest district. Michigan represents the state with the
largest disparities. North Dakota and Maine are the states with the
smallest disparities. The vote values in the smallest districts in
these states are only 1.1 times as much as the largest district.
Within these extremes fall the other 39 states. Georgia ranks ninth
with its smallest district vote counting 2.8 times that of the vote in
its largest district.
The case for rural overrepresentation rests on deep founded
sentiments, prejudices and rationalizations. There are deep founded
sentiments attached to rurally-dominated legislatures that promote a
clinging to the past and a tendency toward maintaining the status quo.
On the other hand, there is a traditional belief that cities are evil.
There appears to be a stereotyped identification of cities with
corrupt politicians, machines and bosses. This expresses itself in
rural fear of urban domination. Moreover, rural citizens rationalize
their claims for maintaining the status quo by alleged claims that
those who are rooted in the soil are the backbone of the nation. They
contend that their vested interests in the soil (as a fast dying
^^Andrew Hacker, Congressional Districting (Washington: The
Brookings Institute, 1963), pp. 113-114.
26
segment of the population) warrant that they be given special considera¬
tion in the legislative bodies of the nation.
No one who is familiar with the problems of the agrarian segment
of the nation's population will deny the existence of such problems.
The point of contention is whether rural problems deserve primacy over
the problems of other minority groups, i.e., so as to warrant them
special consideration in the apportionment schemes of legislatures and
deny that right to other groups.
Whether or not the case for rural overrepresentation is sound
will not hinder rural citizens in their continued rationalizations.
Since man is a rational animal he feels somewhat compelled to give
reasons to maintain or gain his positions of power. In the words of
Professor Hacker man, "instead of simply admitting that he likes
things as they are because they redound to his benefit, he waxes philo¬
sophically and seeks to persuade others that such a state of affairs is
17
in the general interest."
The book Forty-Eight States reports that tradition is a strong
force in state government. When states consider statutory or adminis¬
trative innovations, the first thing a state official is likely to ask
is "why should we change what we're used to?" and the second question
is "what have the other states done about it?"^® The force of tradition
is perpetuated by those who profit from traditional arrangements.
^^Ibid.
^®Allen R. Richards (ed.). The Fourty-Eight States (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 62.
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Legislators who have tasted the fruits of power via favorable position
and political influence neither assist nor encourage change. However,
it goes without saying, that this breed of politician is fast becoming
extinct. Within the confines of democracy, the kind of political game
he has been accustomed to playing is unjustifiable. Neither our U. S.
Constitution nor Declaration of Independence, with all of their expanded
ideals on human equality and justice, will permit him to survive--as is.
He must modify his political values and put them into kilter with the
changing political tempo if he is to survive in the face of possible
political annihilation. There is no other course.
Redress Sought by Urban Areas.—In this section the problem of
what avenues are open to urbanites when legislatures refuse to
reapportion on an equitable basis is the main consideration. Several
possibilities are available which may put the necessary machinery into
operation.
One possibility.open to a few states is the use of the
initiative. A little less than half the state constitutions permit
the use of this weapon.Through the use of the initiative, it might
be possible for a group to capitalize on the voting power of urbanites
in any statewide election and bring about a change in representation.
The use of the initiative, however, requires an unusual amount of
effort and a great deal of money to mobilize the interest of the voters
to the necessary intensity to bring about the desired reforms. Most of
the special interest groups with the necessary zeal to promote the
19
Mitau and Chase, op. cit., pp. 141-143.
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cause of reapportionment seem uninterested in doing so. For many of
them "the status quo which gives a preponderance of legislative power
to the rural legislators is better in their self-interest than a
change." Actually people in three states, Washington, Oregon and
Colorado, have achieved some success through the use of the initiative.
A second possibility open to urbanites is securing usage of
constitutional amendments removing the responsibility for respportion-
ment from the hands of legislators and placing it elsewhere. Likewise
as with the initiative, this possibility presents no simple solution.
It is no simple matter to change state constitutions and place responsi¬
bility elsewhere especially when those same constitutions give the
22
legislators a key role in the amendment process.
The situations described above make it hard for urban areas to
gain relief. The national government has been one source of relief
for many problems of urban areas wherever they have been able to reach
agreement among themselves. However, the federal government has only
been of help in a limited number of areas; and federal regulation
usually accompanies federal aid. Urban areas are reluctant to indebt
themselves to the federal government if it means loss of their
autonomy. Therefore, great representative clashes still exist between





Perhaps, the most important source of redress for urbanites
has been the United States Court System, state and federal. It has
worked diligently in an effort to compel legislatures to do their duty.
Generally speaking, the lower courts within our Court system have
followed the precedents set by the United States Supreme Court in their
interpretations of the law.
When legislators turn their backs on the pleas of urban areas
the latter have, in many instances, turned to the courts for relief.
However, until the 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr, the judicial policy
was one of aloofness.Two exceptions to this policy may be found.
A federal court in Minnesota in 1958 and the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in 1960 accepted jurisdiction over suits brought by urbanites
in an attempt to secure reapportionment of the Minnesota and New Jersey
Legislatures.^^ In both of these cases the courts refused to act until
the respective legislatures had been given time and opportunity to
perform their constitutional duties. However, the courts retained
jurisdiction and indicated that they would take apporpriate judicial
measures to secure reapportionment in the event that the legislatures
persisted in inaction.
Until 1962, the U. S. Supreme Court invoked the 'political
question' doctrine laid down in the landmark case of Colgrove v.
^^Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186 (].962).
^^Snider and Gove, op. cit.. pp. 193-194.
^^Ibid.
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Green, a case on appeal to the Supreme Court from Illinois.^^ Before
discussing the Baker case, a closer look at the Colgrove case might
prove fruitful. Specifically, the Colgrove case was concerned with
the reapportionment of Congressional Districts in Illinois. In the
background loomed state legislative reapportionment problems. The
Illinois Constitution of 1870 provided that the legislature should be
responsible for redistricting the fifty-one districts to meet the
changes in population as they occurred. However, legislators from
down-state rural districts enjoying a comfortable legislative majority,
felt no inclination to yield their political control by reapportionment
to give Chicago its proportion of the fifty-one districts to which its
population entitled it. The last reapportionment of legislative or of
Congressional Districts as reported at the time of the case was in 1901.
It was further observed to a fact that one Congressional District in
Chicago has a population of 914,052, while another had a population of
112,116.^^
When the District Court in Illinois refused to grant relief,
the case was brought to the United States Supreme Court on appeal.
The petitioners were three qualified voters in the most heavily
populated district in Illinois. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the
opinion of the Court. The Appellants' case rested on the contention
that the appellees (certain public officials in the State of Illinois)
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's 'equal protection' and 'privileges
^^Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
^^Ibid.. p. 568.
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and immunities' clauses by failing to reapportion in line with present
population trends. Furthermore, they alleged, that their privileges
as citizens of the United States to vote for Congressmen had been
abridged. This privilege is, they contended, guaranteed to them by
Article I of the United States Constitution.^®
Jurisdiction was not a matter with which the Court concerned
itself at this time. This matter came later. The Court assumed
jurisdiction in Colgrove. however, since the issue had a political
it was decided that judicial restraint was what was called for.
Broom was cited as a partial authority on this policy of non-
Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
We are of the opinion that the petitioners ask of this
Court what is beyond its competence to grant. This is
one of those demands on judicial power which cannot be
met by verbal fencing about 'jurisdiction.' It must
be resolved by consideration on the basis of which the
Court from time to time has refused to intervene in
controversies. It has refused to do so because of due
regard for the effective workings of our government
revealed this issue to be of a peculiarly political
nature and therefore not meet for judicial determina-
In addition, the Court said, that all such cases rest ultimately upon
Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution, which says, "The United
States shall guarantee to every State in this union a Republican form




2®Robert E. Cushman and Robert F. Cushman, Cases in
Constitutional Law (New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, Inc., 1958),
p. 828.
^\bid.. p. 829.
®®Baker V. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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of government' is with Congress.With Congress also is the power to
provide against such injustices as appellants have alleged,It was
then concluded that:
If Congress has failed in exercising its power,
whereby standards of fairness are offended, the
remedy ultimately lies with the people.33
A five to three decision dismissed the case, Mr. Justice Jackson did
not participate. An interesting note in this case is the dissenting
opinion of Justice Black. The reasoning in this opinion makes
interesting reading because it is the opinion taken by the Court as
written by Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr.
The Supreme Court decision setting the stage for unconditional
equal political representation. Baker v. Carr, has brought about
rumblings of political earthquakes which indicate inevitable change
separate and apart from intent. Cause and effect relationships cannot
categorically be established in view of the quagmire of ideas and
opinions preceding and following reapportionment. It is perilous if
not impossible, to predict what all this agitation will--in the final
analysis--yield. Change is sometimes greeted with opposition. Much
energy and effort has been undoubly spent in opposition as well as
compliance to the effects of the about face of the Supreme Court's
here-to-fore hands-off position on reapportionment. Growing pains
usually accompany biological change. So it is with politics. The




Atlanta Journal, in an editorial dated June 28, 1966, points out that
"for a long time we have pointed to the weaknesses, in the hope of
remedy, so that there might be a legislature, not only independent,
but competent." Then present candidates were implored to "this year
speak to the subject of deep running legislative reform, which we
think is strongly desired by the public.
^^"Reform of Legislature," The Atlanta Journal. June 28, 1966,
p. 22.
CHAPTER IV
PROGRESS TOWARDS EQUALITY OF REPRESENTATION
IN STATE LEGISLATURES TODAY
Beginning with the case of Baker v. Carr, fundamental corner¬
stones have gradually been laid by the Courts which provide basic
guidelines in eliminating the inequities of state legislatures. No
apologies are needed or offered for traditional inequities sometimes
caused by the shifts in population over the years and sometimes by
discrimination on purpose. The natural growth of urban areas coupled
with the resistence to change in state legislatures, has caused a
gradual debasement of the urban vote over a period of time. During
this time inequities progressed from 81 per cent to 76 per cent in
counties with 500,000 people and over. The question is what has been
done to alleviate the situation? This is our next major consideration.
Mandates From the Courts.—Baker v. Carr is important because
it overturned the precedent established in Colgrove and rendered the
matter of reapportionment justifiable. Although it failed to set up
a 'yardstick' with which to measure reapportionment cases, the Court
by remanding the case to the lower court, left the implications which
were generally construed to be strongly in favor of urban claims. The
case was decided in March, 1962. The three questions that the Court
ruled upon, at the time, were: First, the justifiability of the
subject matter presented in the case. The Court decided that it was
34
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justifiable. Thus, the lower Court erred in dismissing the case. The
second issue was standing. It was decided that the appellants had
standing to bring suit in federal court. The third question with which
the Court dealt was whether it was within the means of the Court to
grant relief. This issue was also decided in the affirmative.
Actually the basic substantive question of the reapportionment issue
was side stepped by the Court.
Appellants, as qualified voters for members of the General
Assembly of Tennessee, brought suit as means of redressing the alleged
deprivation of their Federal Constitutional Rights. They alleged that
by means of a 1901 statute no longer valid, they were politically used
and misrepresented in their respective state legislature. Thus, they
were, they said, thereby denied the equal protection of the law
guaranteed them by the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellants sought a
declaratory judgment that the 1901 statute was unconstitutional. An
injunction restraining certain officials from conducting any more
elections under it was also sought. Previously, their case had been
dismissed from Federal District Court in light of the Colgrove Doctrine.
Progress since Baker involves.a colossal mass of cases decided
both by the Supreme Court and the lower state and Federal Courts.
This author shall concern himself with the following cases and their
significance upon legislatures and their ills. Let us briefly retro¬
gress for added illumination and clarity. There was an important
state case that antedated Baker.^ This case was Kidd v. McCanless,
^Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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2from the state of Tennessee. The Tennessee Supreme Court refused to
invalidate an apportionment provision because it would have rendered
the state without a legislature, they reasoned. This gives one more
ground upon which to evaluate this whole quagmire of ideas and issues.
The case was decided on the state level consequently its influence was
not felt or utilized to the extent that the Supreme Court cases are.
Next the state of Georgia had an important case decided by the
Supreme Judicial Tribunal. It was Gray v. Sanders.^ The problems
concerned voters of large generally urban populated counties who sought
to check the continued use of unequal voting procedures and standards.
This case and all of its genuine ramifications were finally brought
out by the U. S. Supreme Court in the supplementary case decided at a
later date, Wesberry v. Sanders.^ The Court, in effect, struck down
the standards and procedures of electing state officials as used by
the Neill Primary Act of 1917. This act in effect used the primary
election instead of the General Election results. The county unit
votes for candidates in the primary election went to the candidate
with the highest number of votes in the county. Small rural counties
had franchise superiority. Consequently, a candidate could win an
election by almost exclusively appealing to the small-ever powerful-
rural counties as contrasted to the less powerful urban counties
which in reality had a majority of the citizens, yet a minority of
^Kidd V. McCanless, 292 S.W. 2d 40 (Tenn. 1956).
^Gray v. Sanders. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
Sjesherry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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the voting and legislative strength in the legislature. The Court
invalidated this system of choosing state officials in Georgia. Drew v.
Scranton; Scott v, Germano; and Germano v. Kerner' were cases
involving unequal voting and representative imbalances in Pennsylvania
and the Northern District of Illinois. Scranton v. Drew and Germano v.
Kerner were decided simultaneously by the Federal District Courts and
upheld by the Supreme Court, Scranton involved a general election
plan acceptable and passed by the legislature to govern general
elections. The District Court said if the legislature failed to do
this the Court would institute a plan. This court order was stayed
pending the outcome of the main case in this series—Scott v. Germano.
In Scott the District Court held that a state court reapportionment
decision which indicates that the state court is willing to undertake
supervision of the remedial process is in effect good. It further
stipulated that a plan for apportionment passed by the legislature
must be approved by the Court, This was a significant gesture in that
it marked the entry of the inferiors courts into the refereeing of the
legislative and representative process.
Q
The Supreme Court Case Reynolds v. Sims, marked the initial
judicial utterance of the one man—one vote vote dictum. The Court
^Drew V. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310, 338 (M.D. Pa., 1963),
vacating and remanding per curiam, 379 U.S. 40 (1964).
^Scott V. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965).
^Germano v. Kerner, 241 F. Supp. 715, 722 (N.D. Ill., 1965).
^Reynolds v. Sims; Vann v. Baggett; and McConnell v. Baggett
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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said in unequivocal terms that the strict population standard was to
be applied in apportioning state legislatures in the wake of Baker.
Both houses of a bicameral legislature are to reflect population as
their base of representation. Thus, we have the entry of the strict
population standard as the matter of fact--indirect cure for vote and
representative ills in the state legislatures. There have been many
qualms to this dictum but no repeal has come yet and the ruling still
stands. One of the most outspoken legislative figures against the
one man--one vote idea is Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois, Dirksen
wishes to force the Court out of the political sphere of reapportion¬
ment as well as use other standards in reapportioning state legislatures.
Both of these proposals have failed, in large measure, to take on
popular support, especially to the extent that the Congress would act
in a positive fashion and grant the wishes of Dirksen's camp.
There is perhaps an overriding reason as to why the majority
of the spokesmen for the people--the legislators--have not looked with
favor upon the proposed bills of Senator Dirksen. That reason is
probably because Congress has larger segments of representatives who
look with favor upon balancing and rectifying the ills that have
plagued legislatures too long. In short, they want to distribute the
fruits of democracy equally among the voters who have inherited those
fruits.
Four other cases are considered important by some in a compre¬
hensive analysis of this whole gamut of politics under investigation.
Three Alabama cases were decided by the Supreme Court simultaneously
in 1964. Specifically, they were Reynolds v. Sims, Vann v. Baggett.
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and McConnell v. Baggett.^ Other significant cases in 1964 were:
L^cas V. Colorado General Assembly, and Maryland Committee for Fair
Representation v, Tawes.This mass of judicial research was aimed
at correction of grievances that continued to be brought to the
attention of the judicial branch of the Federal Government.
The Court held that to the extent that an individual is ill-
equipped representatively, to that same extent he is legally dwarfed
as far as voting statue is concerned. Specifically, these cases
involved invidious representative ratios between citizens in 'one
locale' as against citizens in 'another locale.' In terms of the
number of voters in one area as against another, their voters were not
equal as revealed in the voice of their representatives. The Court
said sophisticated, purposeful, unequal representation is just as evil
as simple-minded voter-discrimination. Neither is legally, rationally,
nor ethically justifiable in a democratic milieu. The evils wrought
in the name of justice in democracy like Christianity have been
numerous and degrading to all. Representative democracy like all
other institutions of culture has had its 'ups' and 'downs'. This
researcher does not seek to justify the shortcomings of the system but
rather to present as many of the variables as possible that operate
within an intertwined flux of continuous social change. Choices,
justifications, rationalizations, and biases weighing upon or deter-
^Ibid.
^^Lucas V. Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); and Maryland Committee
V. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964).
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mining precise cause and effect relationships about reapportionment,
voters and representatives belong exclusively to you, the reader.
The three Alabama cases were studied and adjudged by the
Supreme Court simultaneously on the same merits and demerits. All
three concerned the same general grievances of Alabama voters against
their state officials. The cases were brought via appeal to the
Supreme Court by Alabama citizens of urban districts who were able to
see the large representative variance of equality between certain
population segments in the state of Alabama. Moreover, they saw within
their legislative pseudo-equitable legislative representation for
districts with population (voter) majority. The Court held; The equal
protection clause means quantitatively and qualitatively equal legis¬
lative representation for all citizens. Population is the basis of
equality in both houses in a bicameral legislature; The District Court
was justified in its detection and rejection of an invalid proposed
plan for apportionment drawn up hostilely by the legislature; It
disapproved of the use of the 'federal analogy' as a state plan of
legislative representation; Flexibility was advocated in permitting
minute deviation from the rigid exacting population standards as long
as the bases of reapportionment was population; "Congressional
approval could not validate and unconstitutional state legislative
apportionment."^^
The polarization of 'Congress' and the 'Court' over jurisdiction
is implicit in the above idea of the Court that Congress cannot validate
^^Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), at p. 582.
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an unconstitutional state legislative apportionment. In effect, the
Court maintains that no unequal quantity of legislative unequal
elements when added together will yield equality. Truth and equality
must of necessity be free of falseness and inequality. Congress is
the ultimate source of power since in effect it is the people. With
this in mind, one may ask what agency then can render an invalid law,
act, or practice valid—and thus Constitutional? The truth of the
matter—in terms of wy values—is that no combination of legislation
and rationalization can render an unconstitutional practice consti¬
tutional. At best, repeal or new legislation compatible with the U. S.
Constitution are the avenues of change and correction for virtually all
governmental maladies.
12
Lucas V. Colorado went to the Supreme Tribunal involving
issues of voter debasement and representative inequality just as the
other cases had gone—on appeal. The Court reiterated its rule in
Reynolds v. Sims: that the "federal analogy" of representation in
state legislatures is inapplicable; that repeated refusal of the
legislature to perform its reapportionment task would make federal
intervention inevitable.
Maryland v. Tawes'^'^ centered around issues on and about
constitutionally compatible and judicially acceptable plans for
redistricting. Specifically the Court pointed out: That a compre¬
hensive and full evaluation of an apportionment plan cannot be made
^^Lucas V. Colorado. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
^Maryland v. Tawes. 377 U.S. 656 (1964).
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except it include provisions for both houses of a bicameral legislature.
The states were not to hold further elections under prevailing or newly
adopted unconstitutional representative conditions and plans. "State
Courts are encouraged to assume the remedial role in reapportionment.
Germano v. Kerner.and Scott v. Germano.were covered in the
same decision by the Court in 1965. The first case was entered on the
Northern District Court level and involved urban awareness of outmoded
election processes which in effect discriminated against majority
voting elements in the state of Illinois. After Germano v. Kerner was
remanded both the senate and house reapportioned their chambers. The
real problem came in jointly compiling a combined reapportionment plan
since the Courts now have to approve all bicameral legislative
reapportionment plans. In the final analysis they (house and senate)
could not agree on a plan so the courts have taken over the task,
especially in Pennsylvania since this state had a vested interest in
these allied cited Illinois cases. One house, sometimes out of
political expedience in submitting joint reapportionment plans may
refuse to make concessions with the feeling that a stalemate will be
to their advantage. The ways of power are omnipresent bearing numerous
dimensions and much intensity.
^^Germano v. Kerner. 241 F. Supp. 715 and remanded sub nom.
Scott V. Germano. 381 U.S. 407 (1965).
^^Scott V. Germano. 381 U.S. 407 (1965).
43
Pennsylvania "political problem bearers" breathed a sigh of
relief with the decision of Scott v. Germano. Many of their immediate
political tensions were relieved. They had looked at the above Illinois
case for guidance in soothing their own long lingering voter-legisla¬
tive wounds. The District Court initiated the idea that all apportion¬
ment plans must be approved by the Court. It also "ordered the
defendants to show justification why the elections of 1966 should not
be held 'at large' in the event of legislative default.The U. S.
Supreme Court in its deicision in Scott v. Germano upheld the mandates
of the lower District Court and said not only did the District and
State Courts have refereeing jurisdiction in reapportionment cases,
but they were urged to implement that jurisdiction to help eradicate
the equal voter-infirmities that beset state houses. On default
of state agencies, the District Court was authorized to issue its own
18
plan or to order an election at large. The State Court is
encouraged in these matters more so than the District Court.
The last case of major significance considered in this thesis
IQ
is Sims V. Baggett. This case with all of its ramifications brings
back to memory the issues of the somewhat parallel case, Gomillion v.
Lightfoot. Both cases involved the Southwestern neighbor state,
Alabama, where the Wallace dynasty (with intent to defy Federal
^^Ibid.
^^Drew V. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310, 338 (M.D. Pa. 1963).
%bid.
^^Sims V. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
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proclamations and statutes) conspiring to misrepresent ethnic groups
(especially the Negro), is still in power.
The Supreme Court held in the Gomillion v. Lightfoot case^^
that intentional, planned political gerrymandering of areas and
districts (so as to exclude the Negro from participating via the
elective franchise in the political arena) constitutes due cause for
action against such an affront and mockery to democracy and justice.
21A 1962 case, Wright v. Rockefeller, involving congressional districts
failed for want of sufficient proof of intentional discriminatory
gerrymandering in the state of New York. The Alabama District Court
took the following position in Sims v. Baggett; In New York non¬
whites had long been denied the vote; New York district lines had long
been erratic while Alabama had historically been districted by the use
of single county units. The plan before the Court employed multi¬
county units which turned Negro majorities into Negro minorities;
The Court found "the effect of the plan . . . the intent of the legis-
lature inferentially was to discriminate against Negroes." Thus the
Court held invalid the apportionment of the Alabama house.
The District Court has succinctly expressed the legitimate
point of grievance, for the most part throughout the South. Alabama,
due to elements beyond her control, has been thrown into the limelight
epitomizing the contentions of those who would deny rights to non-white
^^Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
^Hjright V. Rockefeller, 372 U.S. 52 (1962).
22Sims V. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D, Ala. 1965).
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ethnic'groups out of chauvinism. The Court summed up this authors
position on debasement of votes and gerrymandering succinctly with
great judicial finnesse in Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, when
it said:
There should be no hesitation ... in providing a
remedy for gerrymandering, . . . malapportionment
merely dilutes the weight of an individually case
vote vis-a-vis votes cast in other districts, gerry¬
mandering completely eradicates the weight of the
vote - it may as well have never been case.23
However, for emphasis, clarity and illumination let us recapitulate
for a moment.
In Scholle v. Hare, the Court had carefully avoided ruling on
the issue which the lower Court had to concern itself with. This
factor was brought out in the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan
and Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Baker case. Lower Court decisions
tend to indicate that they have treated the Baker decision as a subtle
invitation for them to rule in favor of limitations imposed on legis¬
lative apportionment by the 'equal protection* of the law as construed
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution.^^
Baker v. Carr opened the floodgates for a host of litigation
on the subject of reapportionment. Scholle v. Hare was one of those
cases.It was a case on appeal from the Michigan Supreme Court. A
^^Lucas V, Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
2^See the National Civic Review, the special section devoted
to "Reapportionment" in issues September through November, beginning
Vol. 43 (1962), pp. 294-296.
^^Scholle V. Hare, 369 U.S. 429 (1962).
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1952 constitutional amendment had frozen the seats in the Michigan
Senate. This act had the effect of maintaining numerical voting
inequities. Appellants sought redress claiming offense of their
"Fourteenth Amendment - equal protection" guarantees. The case was
decided in per curiam statements and remanded to the Michigan Supreme
Court for reconsideration in light of Baker v. Carr.
The next real progress (as previously stated) toward equality
of representation was a result of two Georgia cases, a Colorado case
and several Alabama cases. They are identified as Gray v. Sanders
28Wesberry v. Sanders; Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Colorado General Assembly
30 31Vann v. Baggett; McConnell v. Baggett; and Maryland Committee for
32
Fair Representation v. Tawes.
The decision in Gray v. Sanders, as mentioned before, struck
down the historical Georgia County-Unit System. The County-Unit
System was enacted by the Neill Primary Act of 1917. By this act the
main election for statewide officers in Georgia became the primary
^%bid.
^^Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
^^esberry v. Sanders. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
^^Lucas V. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
^®Vann v. Baggett, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
^%cConnell v. Baggett, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).




election (using a fixed ratio set by the Neill Primary Act).^^ Since
the ''all or none** principle was applied;it was possible for a
gubernatorial candidate to win the election by making his campaign
appeal to the small counties in Georgia. This meant that the control
of the statewide election processes was in the hands of a minority of
the voters in Georgia, that is, those voters who resided in the smallest
populated counties.
Sanders was a 1962 gubernatorial candidate representing the
views of urban areas and appealing to the larger counties in Georgia.
Realizing that he had hardly a "ghost of a chance" at winning an
election conducted under the Neill Primary Act, he sought an injunction
to restrain officials from conducting any more elections using the
system. The claims in the case rested on the resulted dilution of the
weight of the voters in urban counties merely because of their
residence in counties of the first two categories. Those with six
county-unit votes and those with four county-unit votes constitute
the first two categories.
The case came before the Supreme Court on an appeal from Gray
who was seeking a reversal of the Federal District Court's ruling in
^^Based on representation in the Georgia House of Representa¬
tives, each of the 159 counties in Georgia were allotted twice as
many county-unit votes as it has representatives in the Georgia House.
The eight largest counties had 3 representatives each; the next thirty
counties had 2 representatives each; the next one-hundred and twenty-
one counties had one representative each.
^^The 'all or none' principle meant that the candidate
receiving the majority of a county's popular vote in the primary
election received all of the county's county-unit vote.
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favor of Sanders. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court,
reaffirmed the Lower Court decision. The decision rested on the fact
that the County-unit system "gave certain Georgia Counties great voting
strength in electing statewide officers than a population standard
would have."^^
In the wake of the Gray case, there took place profound and
fundamental changes in the political character of gubernatorial
campaigns in Georgia. Some candidates who had not calculated on the
discontinuance of the County-unit system, suffered humiliating defeats
during the 1962 campaign. They had campaigned in the traditional
manner—appealing to the old power elite. Among the present
gubernatonal candidates ignorance of this political fact is still
apparent. There is no doubt that the Gray decision struck at the
heart of invidious voter-value inequities in Georgia's statewide
elections. However, it remained for Wesberry v. Sanders to challenge
equality in representation among electoral districts in Georgia.
The issue in Wesberry v. Sanders were the disparities in the
population between Congressional Districts in Georgia. Specifically,
appellants were citizens and qualified voters of Fulton County, Georgia,
and as such entitled to vote in Congressional elections in Georgia's
Fifth Congressional District. The Fifth District was one of 10
Congressional Districts in Georgia and included the counties of
Fulton, Dekalb and Rockdale. The 1960 census figures list the combined
^^Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
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population of these counties at 823,680. Tremendous disparities are
noted when this figure is compared with the average population of the
10 Districts, which is 394,312. One District, the Ninth, has only
272,154 people in it, less one-third as many as the Fifth District.
Appellants claims rested on the contention that:
These population disparities deprived them and
voters similarly situated of a right to have their
votes for Congressman given the same weight as the
votes of other Georgians.
Mr. Justice Black delivered the Opinion of the Court. He
dealt with the claims of the District Court that the case was wholly
a 'political question'* and not justifiable. The Lower Court had dis¬
missed the case for "want of equity." Citing Baker v. Carr as
precedent on the justifiability of the case, the Court remanded the
case to the Lower Court for reconsideration in that light.
In anexamination of the merits of the case by the Court, it
was found that the Georgia apportionment statute, in operation at that
time, contracted some votes and expanded others. The Court said that
Article L, Section 2 of the Constitution, as construed within its
historical context, demands "that as nearly as practicable one man's
vote in a Congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." '
The Georgia apportionment statute was adjudged unconstitutional on that
basis.
^^Wesberry v. Sanders. 376 U.S. 1 (1964)
^^Ibid.
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Baker v. Carr can be said to have opened the doors to the
Courts on the matter of state legislative apportionment; it was
certainly in Reynolds v. Sims that the Court broke the barriers of
state legislative apportionment inequities. Both houses of state
legislatures are now subject to limitations imposed by the "equal
protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in apportioning their
representation.
The Reynolds case was one among six cases decided in June,
1964. Reapportionment of state legislatures in six states was attacked
as violative of the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amend¬
ment to the United States Constitution, States in the litigations
included Alabama, New York, Maryland, Virginia, Delaware and Colorado.
In each case, but one a gross inequality of population in state legis¬
lative districts existed with the result that a vote in one district
was, for all practical purposes, worth much more than a vote in other
OQ
districts. Chief Justice Warren delived the Court's Opinion.
Summarily, the Court held that "the equal protection" clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment required every state to structure its legisla¬
ture so that all the members of each house represent substantially the
same number of people. Other factors may be given play only to the
extent that they do not significantly encroach on this basic
"population" principle.This decision was reached in Reynolds through
38hi- 1 iman M. Bishop and Samuel Hendel, Basic Issues of American
Democracy (New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, 1965), p. 232.
^^Reynolds v. Sims. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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classical democratic rationalization. After having first established
jurisdiction over the cases, the Court established the importance of
the elective franchise. It said:
Undeniably the Constitution of the United States
protects the right of all qualified citizens to
vote in state as well as Federal elections ....
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's
choice is of the essence of a democratic society and
any restrictions on that right strikes at the heart
of representative government.^®
Moreover, it was argued by the Court that undoubtedly, the right of
suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free society; especially since
"the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner
is preservative of other basic civil and political rights.
Upon this basis then, the Court proceeded to carefully and
meticulously scrutinize the alleged infringements of the rights of
urban plantiffs involved. In this respect, Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 at 342, and Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 at 275 were
cited as precedent that:
Weighting the votes of citizens differently by
any method or means, merely because of where
they happen to reside is hardly justifiable.
One must be ever aware that the Constitution
forbids 'sophistocated' as well as simple-minded
modes of discrimination.^2
The Court went on to disqualify the applicability of 'the
federal analogy' to state legislative apportionment arrangements.
^®Bishop and Hendel, op. cit., p. 232. Terms underlined for
emphasis by author.
^^Ibid.. p. 234.
^^Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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The "federal analogy" refers to the patterning of state legislatures
after the United States Congress. This would mean representation
according to population in one house (usually the lower house) and equal
representation in the other house. It was reasoned by the Court that
"the system of representation in the two Houses of the Federal Congress
is one ingrained in our Constitution." The system also represented a
compromise between the formerly independent large and small states
designed to avert a deadlock at the Constitutional Convention. Mean¬
while, political subdivisions of the states are dependent governmental
instrumentalities created by the state to assist in carrying out state
governmental functions.
Conflicting views prevail on the Court's stand in reapportion¬
ment issues. Excitement exists on both sides. Southern Conservatives,
who stand to lose power, find another issue upon which to base their
cries for the necessary impeachment of Chief Justice Warren and
Federal intervention to curtail the influence of the Court in areas
which conflict with "states rights doctrines." Meanwhile, urban areas
think they may have finally found a road leading to the solution of
many of their peculiarly urban problems.
Considering reapportionment in the light of the Warren
Court's solicitude towards civil rights; it is found that urban
citizens represent another instance in which the colossal machinery
of government afforded no apparent remedy short of Federal Court
intervention.
The reapportionment cases have had twofold implications.
First, the representative bodies must take on change in light of
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changing values. Second, our famous Court system, acting in its quasi¬
legislative capacity, has drastically modified its original stand in
the matter of reapportionment and have, in large measure, influenced
the change in the values which legislatures must now adopt. In other
words, modification and change in the evolutionary process have been
inevitable.
Review of Progress Made.—In the aftermath of Baker v. Carr, a
continuous array of suits have been brought. The Courts generally have
decided in favor of the Constitutional claims made by urban areas.
However, they have shown leniency toward letting the states, in special
legislative sessions, make remedies without judicial compulsion where
possible.
What have urban areas gained as a result of reapportionment
cases? Actually the urban gains are not readily assessible at this
point. They have not been separately identified from suburban gains.
Moreover, statistics are available to show that only 9 states have
already reapportioned their legislature as of January, 1965. By mid-
1965, 7 additional states had achieved federally-approved plans for
reapportionment. However, the remainder of the states have failed,
either totally or in part to achieve acceptable reapportionment plans.
See Table 1 for identification of states which have or have not
measured up to federally acceptable reapportionment plans.
It is noted that in mid-1965, of the 34 states that had not
complied with the Supreme Court ruling, Indiana, Idaho, Texas, North
Dakota, Tennessee and Florida had engaged in revision of both legisla¬
tive bodies. However, in all 6 states the new patterns were being
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challenged in the Courts or had not yet been reviewed by them. The
remaining 28 states had either submitted incomplete plans, plans for
only one house, temporary plans, or they had failed to submit plans
at all.
CHAPTER V
THE IMPACT OF ONE MAN--ONE VOTE REAPPORTIONMENT
ON AMERICAN POLITICS
The process of change generated by reapportionment decisions
have had a variety of effects, both expected and unexpected. They are
effects which cover many aspects of American politics. One man—one
vote reapportionment have had effects on the American Court System;
legislators and officials; pressure groups and political parties; the
individual citizen and municipalities.
The Impact on the Courts.—The United States Supreme Court has
long stood in the hallowed position of being the ultimate interpreter
of the United States Constitution. Marbury v. Madison (1803),
established the principle of judicial review whereby the power of the
Court to interpret the Constitution was established. The power of
judicial review rests on the Constitutional sections of Article I,
Sections 1 and 2 and Article VI. As the chief interpreter of the
Constitution, it is generally felt that the Court is and should be
removed from the political arena.^
Justices of the Court have expressed this attitude in their
avoidance of certain issues which have had political overtones. On
^Justices do. not campaign for public office. They are
appointed. They generally hold office for life. Thus they are not
concerned with catering to the whims of politicians.
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this basis then the Court's "political question" doctrine can be
justified.
The issue of reapportionment has been regarded by the Court as
one of those peculiar questions, the remedy to which lay with the
political branches of government until 1962. Even then, some of the
Justices felt the danger of repercussions from the Court's so-called
"entrance into the political thicket." Mr. Justice Frankfurter
predicted, in his dissent in Baker v. Carr, that the Court's entrance
into the political thicket of reapportionment "might well impair the
Court's position as the ultimate organ of 'the Supreme Law of the Land.'"
This position, he said, "ultimately rests on sustained public confidence
O
in (the Court's) moral sanction." This feared crisis of the loss of
O
public confidence seems to have failed to materialize."^ Partially
because the slogan one man--one vote has certain egalitarian appeal and
partially because of the difficulty individuals have in determining how
they are effected by reapportionraent.
There is, however, one definite effect reapportionment has had
on the Court. Certain legislators have started a movement to amend the
Court's appellate jurisdiction and exclude reapportionment issues from
that jurisdiction. Senator Everett Dirksen was the innovator and
sponsor of a bill (which thrice failed to pass) amending the Court's
appellate jurisdiction. Appellant jurisdiction is extended by Congress
and thus may be altered by Congress. This bill was initiated by
^Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
harvard Law Review, Vol. 79 (1966), p. 1228.
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Senator Dirksen as a delaying tactic until he had had the time to
introduce an amendment to the effect that the application of the one
man—one vote theory to legislative bodies would be made ineffective.
Fortunately, neither of Senator Dirksen's plans succeeded. The cause
for reapportionment would have been set back many years. Still,
however, certain state legislators and pressure groups, who stand to
lose power by the application of the.one man--one vote formula, have
launched a movement to urge states to file petitions with Congress for
a Constitutional Amending Convention designed to tie the hands of the
Courts indefinitely in the area of reapportionment. There is little
hope of their success, since 18 states have already passed resolutions
against such a Convention. Eighteen states are more than enough to
prevent the Convention.
The Court's progress toward the universal application of the
one man—one vote principle to state legislatures, reveals that of the
six Justices who joined in the result in Baker v. Carr, only four:
Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and the Chief Justice concurred in
the population standard in Reynolds v. Sims.^ These four were joined
by Justices White and Goldberg. In the word of Justice Harlan, the
other Justices tended to think that the Court's actions represented
"an experiment in venturesome constitutionalism."
The Impact on the Individual.—Perhaps one of the most difficult
things to analyze is the impact of reapportionment on the individual.
Each individual is an amalgam of loyalties that are more or less
^Ibid.. p. 1230.
58
contradictions of one another. The private citizen may align himself
with one or more of the various pressure groups and political parties
that stand to win or lose through reapportionment.
The average individual is neither politician nor well-informed
on the particulars of reapportionment dictates by the Courts, He has
a hard time visualizing political gains and losses that do not directly
affect him or play havoc with his obtaining the basic necessities and
comforts of life. Usually he is dependent and finds himself at the
mercy of politicians and mass news media for the formation of what
opinions he may have. These sources, more than likely, present
distorted pictures designed to protect their stake in the matter and
influence his choices at the polls.
Assuming that the individual is able to bypass these obstacles,
he is still faced with the problem of determining what his immediate
benefits will be. When the "smoke" has cleared and both houses have
been reapportioned according to Federally-acceptable plans, who
actually stands to gain? It is possible that the urban citizen may
wake up and find that it is no longer a question of rural v. urban
in state legislatures, but a question of urban v. suburban. Statistics
tend to support that in the long run, the largest gains will go to the
suburbs. That is the general direction that the nation's population
is shifting. A recent study shows that in almost one-half of the 23
metropolitan centers of over one million population, the suburbs
already have a larger population than the central cities.^ In this
^"Suburbia Takes Over," National Civic Review, Vol. 43, 1965,
pp. 294-296.
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same study it was predicted that by 1980, only New York, Dallas, and
Houston will retain their numerical superiority.
Thus the impact which reapportionment has.on the individual is
influenced by all of these several factors. Impact has to take into
account the individual's political loyalties, his living locale, the
extent of his awareness of the issue and his education through mass
media and politicians.
Impact on Municipalities.--One effect that one man—one vote
reapportionment has had on urban municipalities has been the tendency
to increase their representation in the states' legislatures. The
aggregate voters in municipalities will no longer be able to complain
about the inequities in their vote-value. Now just whether this will
have the desired result in terms of state legislation beneficial to
municipal government or not is questionable. It has already been
mentioned that in computing the actual gains between urban and
suburban areas, the odds seem stacked in favor of suburban areas. Of
course, we note the trend of reasoning in the Harvard Law Review that
it is possible for an urban dominated legislature to gerrymander the
state's district constituency in such a manner that the suburban vote
would be attached to the urban vote and thus be outnumbered while still
staying within the bounds of the one man—one vote principle.
Perhaps the most profound and far-reaching effect that one man—
one vote reapportionment has had on municipalities represents a recent
innovation of state and lower courts. These tribunals have carried
the one man—one vote principle to its logical conclusion and held that
municipalities are subject to it in their municipal legislative
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apportionment schemes. This is still a speculative area of adjudica¬
tion as it has not been ruled upon by the United States Supreme Court.
However, the reasoning in such cases is based upon the Court's rulings
in civil rights "equal protection" cases in which the Court has held
that the states and their agencies are subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The first case in which municipal one man—one vote reapportion¬
ment was required was the result of a decision handed down about three
months after Reynolds v. Sims. A Michigan County Circuit Court handed
down the decision.^ Four states have had sub-state adjudication on the
districting schemes of city and county legislators.^ While California,
New Jersey, Wisconsin, New Hampshire, New York and South Dakota have
cases on the courts' dockets.
Cities and counties are traditionally regarded as agencies of
the states. If they make use of the electoral processes, then it is
natural to assume that these methods will also be subjected to the one
man--one vote principle as implied by the Fourteenth Amendment. After
all, if the right to vote is the basic right upon which other civil
and political rights are contingent, then certainly a man deserves to
have his voice ring out loudest in that government that is closest to
him in area, proximity and effect.
^Brouwer v. Bronkema, N 1855 Kent County Michigan Cir. Ct.,
September 11, 1965 as reprinted in the National Municipal League,
Court Decisions on Legislative Reapportionment, Vol. 81 (1965).
^National Civic Review, Vol. 54 (1965), p. 264.
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The Impact on State Power Politics.—The whole phenomenon of
state power politics is vast. Power is traditionally defined as
possessing the ability to influence. We find many individuals and
groups within the sphere of state politics. For purposes of discussion,
the general reference in this section shall be to such groups as legis¬
lators and state officials, pressure groups, political parties, and
propaganda disseminators.
Varying attitudes toward power help explain the seeming
contradiction in the fact that Americans who have experienced the evils,
which they seek to rid society of, seem more extreme in their position
than those who have grown up with the best that America has to offer.
Representative democracy in America is not perfect. Too many people
within it are excluded from the political and economic participation
in the inheritance they are due. The exercise of privileges are con¬
centrated in too small a group. However, the primary ingredient for
O
change is now present—one man—one vote.° The powerless of today
can become the powerful of tomorrow by effectively using it. In other
words social and economic justice lay within the political sphere.
The future of desires for justice, equality and voter efficacy lay
with the numbers of people possessing those desires. Numbers are
crucial.
Since the reapportionment decision, the old forms of pressing
9hostilities between the regions have changed surprisingly little.
^Hillman M. Bishop and Samuel Hendel, Basic Issues of American
Democracy (New York; Appleton-Century-Croft, 1965), p. 82.
^Ibid.
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And where they have changed, it has usually been in the direction of
divergence rather than concurrence. The Texan notoriously, is more
Texan now than ever. The Nevadan, with a feeling of being federally
hemmed in feels this way also because the National government owns the
lion's share of his state's land. The Chicago businessman is still
as anxious as ever to convince you that in no sense but population is
his bailiwick "the second city to New York." The South especially
provides strong resenting testimony in the wake of one man--one vote
reapportionment, to those who try to realize the full worth of their
vote and citizenship. Pockets of hard-core segregationists, often
law enforcement officials, throughout Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi
and Georgia without hesitation let the nation see and know that they
oppose most change. They do so in a most dastardly fashion. Specifi¬
cally, all change bearing upon the full emancipation and equality for
the Negro is opposed by these forces. But with the Supreme Court
ruling, standing as firm as the rock of Gibraltar, what can the states
do in keeping with the legal and democratic tradition we hold so dear?
What legal resource is open to those who oppose inevitable change?
What legal channels are left to those who would hinder genuine citizen
equality in any respect?
If the focal issue--reapportionment--is to be based on "equal
protection" for all citizens, then the goal must be equitable districts
and representative equality for all. "Equal protection and representa¬
tion," in substance, are inseparable; they can more fruitfully be
viewed in terms of civil liberties. In view of present matters there
are over forty million Americans being deprived of their full voice at
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the polls and full representation in Congress because they have made
their homes in communities that somehow-“Out of no fault of their own--
failed to secure political favor.State legislatures have not had a
reputation for being active champions of civil rights. This is the
chief reason why the Federal Courts have been asked to intervene.
It is true that those who stand to lose by districting and
representative reforms are themselves a minority group, the fact remains
that overrepresentation of any section is had at the cost of under¬
representing another. The exaction of such a price is too much to ask
at a time when the political equality of Americans has becoijie a formost
controversial issue. "The goal of citizen equality is unambiguous and
the road is well marked thereto."
It is not clear to what extent the states' legislatures will
become increasingly representative or vice versa in the immediate
coming years. Gross disparities in "voter weight" will have to be
discarded if urban and suburban voters are to have equal voice at
their respective state capitols. The supreme law says that they must.
So ahead is a long tedious journey for states culminating only when
all state legislatures are "in fact" based on the principle of "one
man--one vote." It will probably take a cross-current of conflicting
factions and interests rather than a sense of "fair play" to force
legislators to create districts where no group gains at the expense of
another. This writer realizes that not all practical justice and
legal principles are easily reconciled. This is all the more reason
^^Stephen K. Bailey, The New Congress (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1966), pp. 107-108.
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to redouble our efforts toward just representation. In verbal and
written discourses on reapportionment, the question is often asked who
needs the seats most? The rural contention is not simply one for equal
representation, but rather for the retention of overrepresentation on
the ground that the problems and character of its constituents demand
a stronger than average voice in the law-making body.^^ Suburbanites
ask only for equal voter status with every other American citizen.
Voters are obviously not satisfied by Just any set of criteria
and since all discipline in the final analysis is directed toward self-
discipline, they are their own judges in the final analysis. They
choose through representatives the criteria which seems to make
political restraint most bearable. All of the court cases and law
enforcement agencies are not enough to force compliance if the majority
decided to reject the one man—one vote proposal. Change must be
within the behavior of men. So far, there has been no political
system that has functioned perfectly to meet all human requirements.
Perhaps there will never be. But, there have been some areas of
progress, often sporadic, in the drama of history that have better
accommodated man's requirements and allowed for development and change.
Some propogators of rural versus urban voter inequality raise
the "specter of political monopoly by cities." By this they mean that
cities and suburbs, if given equal voter quality will align themselves
in a punitive fashion against rural factions. There is little justifi-
^^Glendon Schubert (ed.), Reapportionment (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1965), pp. 11-16.
65
cation for such a position because there is divergence and great degrees
of differences within and among large heterogenous groupings—who com¬
prise cities--that tend to offset in most instances any uniformity or
full cohesion among voters even within closely knit physically proximate
districts of urban areas. The writer maintains this position even
though political resources which tend to influence voter choices are
more easily accessible to urbanites than ruralites.
Among the political groups profoundly affected by reapportion¬
ment are the major parties. The Republican Party is expected to gain
at least a toehold in states that have been traditionally democratic
12here-to-fore controlled by down-state rural districts and visa versa.
In other words. Democrats and Republicans can be expected to gain in
areas where they have been weak. Candidates for public office can no
longer ignore the power of minority groups in the urban centers and
must design their campaigns to appeal to these groups. A good
example of this can be seen in the Negro block-voting that takes place
in the South and the fact that since 1962 Georgia has had elected from
13
Atlanta seven Negro legislators to its legislature. Labor unions
are also becoming a force in Southern politics to be reckoned with.
No aspect of life can be expected to go uninfluenced by the ongoing
political machinery of democracy in America. Aristotle once argued
that political science is the master science. Implicit in his argument
was the fact that all of man's behavior is subservant and dependent
upon his political self.




The principle of one man--one vote has equalitarian connotations
essential to the operation of democratic government. Democratic govern¬
ment is founded upon popular sovereignty. This means, of course, that
the people are expected to determine the broad course of politics. The
most effective method of performing this function is through the use of
the ballot.
"The people" is a phrase referring to the amalgamation of
individuals that combined make up the population and citizenry of a
country. It is incorrect to assume that democratic theory would allow
this amalgamation of individuals to be subdivided in any way so as to
give unique advantage to any particular segment. This particular
segment would then constitute a political elite and the form of govern¬
ment would change into an oligarchy. The principle of one man--one
vote forbids this type of discrimination in a democracy.
That the principle of one man--one vote is a part of our United
States Constitution is now evident as the Courts of the Nation have
proceeded down the array of reapportionment cases, striking out
inequity after inequity where states have failed to take note of the
changing living locales of the greater amount of their population.
Starting with the case of Baker v. Carr in which the Supreme Court
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announced its entrance into the reapportionment "political thicket" and
hailed to the aid of urbanites; the Court gradually proceeded to the
universal application of the population principle to state legislatures.
In Sanders v. Gray, a round was won for urban voters of Georgia who had
long had their vote debased in statewide elections for state officials
using the County-Unit System. Another round went to Georgia's urban
voters when in Wesberry v. Sanders, Federal District constituency was
struck down as being violative of the one man--one vote principle
implied by the Fourteenth Amendment. Reynolds v. Sims and its sister
cases saw the universal application of the one mcin--one vote principle
to both houses of a state's legislature.
The Colgrove v. Green case^ is thought to be the beginning of
the current reapportionment issue. Though, it was in Baker v. Carr^
that the Court decided to decide upon political questions. This marked
a divergence from the prevailing Frankfurter doctrine of non-entry into
the "political thicket" held in Colgrove. Colgrove specifically
involved the state of Illinois and a body of its citizens from the
largest populated districts who contested the alleged debasement of
their vote and in effect their representative voice. The Supreme Court,
as has already been stated, held that it should not render decision on
political issues. Thus appellants did not get immediate restitution.
Many voters because of living locale, preconceived legislature notions
of power balance, and placement of representatives, suffered. The
^Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
^Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Court, also, said, in effect, that restitution for political grievances
lay with the following institutions of government: state legislatures
(in harmony with the U. S. Constitution), the federal legislature
(Congress), and after exhausting the appeal process to these agencies,
if grievances are not "in good faith" dealt with then, the Supreme
Court would act on the behalf of citizens so grieved.
Approximately, twelve years later, the Court was to shift its
prevailing contention in Colgrove, as it decided to decide (reluctantly)
on issues within the "political thicket". This landmark case was
Baker v. Carr. In Baker the Court decided that the question of
reapportionment was justiciable. Literature cites two instances of
variance from the non-justiciable rule between Colgrove (1946) and
Baker (1962). They involve a Federal Court in the State of Minnesota
in 1958, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1960. These Courts
accepted jurisdiction over suits brought by urbanites in an attempt
to secure apportionment of the Minnesota and New Jersey legislatures.
Since Colgrove, in 1946, the Supreme Court has reversed itself.
Some would no doubt hold this to be an unpardonable breach of public
democratic trust. But, history is a continium of events and organisms
constantly in flux. Change, to some degree, is inevitable. The
Court in Colgrove decided to not decide political questions. However,
since state agencies and machinery for redress have broken down, it
has been necessary for it ro reverse this position. This has been
3
done; and via Reynolds v. Sims the Court has even given us the
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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reapportionment yardstick to be used by bicameral state legislatures.
Reflections on progress of Court mandates regarding reapportionment
reveals the following to be true:
The Court in Gray^ was concerned with representative districts
alleged unequally represented thus voting debased. Specifically, it
struct down the County-Unit System of electing state officials. The
Wesberry case^ involved the Congressional Districts allegedly unfairly
represented thus unequal in voting power—via the less than equal
representatives.
£
In Scott V. Germano° the whole issue or (phase) of legitimate
judicially approved constitutional plans of reapportionment was
unveiled. The Court urged the state courts to take the initiative
and assume a formidable role in refereeing reapportionment—house and
senate--via the one man one-one vote yardstick. The degree of
applicability of the pure population standard of reapportionment is
questionable. If it is capable of being applied surely there must be
much involvement for/to voters and legislators alike ahead.
In Sims v. Baggett^ the gripping issue of gerrymandering comes
to the fore. The Court points out that this is the prime factor in
voter equality. If it is operative unfavorably you may as well not
vote. There are many cases not reported here the writer is aware.
^Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
^Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
^Scott V. Germane, 381 U.S. 407 (1965).
^Sims V. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
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Those prime cases involving establishment of Constitutional Principles
were our major concern. Others are incidental.
What has been the effects of reapportionment on the process of
American politics? The reverberations are still being heard and will
continue to be heard. However these conclusions can be drawn:
1. Only 16 of the states have either completely
reapportioned or had their plans approved by
Federal Courts as of mid-1965.
2. The Courts have excited much criticism and
opposition from both within and without.
3. There is an anticipated shift in alignments of
power within the state legislatures.
4. Also anticipated is an alteration of party
control within the state and nation.
5. Political campaigns must now be designed to
appeal to the urban voter.
6. In this same line of thinking, urban minorities
and ethnic groups will be gaining more political
consideration as they realize the strength of
their combined votes and begin to mobilize their
efforts in that direction.
These are a few of the effects reapportionment have had on American
politics. More are anticipated and will no doubt occur.
Gross inequities, caused by the inevitable growth of the
nation in an urban direction, sowed the seeds and nurtured the
environment within which the reapportionment controversy grew. However,
71
unintentional the inequities were at the beginning, they were of such
nature that one cannot deny the ties to tradition and the vested
interests of rural legislators have made compulsory compliance to the
principle of one man--one vote necessary. The phrase compulsory
compliance is used here to mean that mandates from the courts have
been necessary to cause most reapportionment in line with the one man—
one vote or the population principle.
All aspects of human nature are intwined and interdependent.
So this thesis does not deal with a static inanimate phenomena capable
of being analyzed and given final approval or rejection in terms of
one's values. But rather it deals with the highest living organism
in his many and varied relationships to his environment and his
fellows-man. As Francis Bacon once observed "it is a miserable state
of mind to have few things to desire and many things to fear," If
men are to enjoy the desires and blessings of democracy, they must
learn through experience to build sets of flexible values advantageous
to all. Otherwise, political chaos will inevitably result. Political
systems by handing on the memories of those who lived in the past and
who shared similar loyalties and by holding up a vision of what lies
ahead, present a rich heritage and take on added significance and hope
for those who gain that heritage.
Whatever forms state legislatures assume, citizens can make
a choice of resigning themselves to the temper of the times or of
insulating themselves as much as possible against the ways of power.
Those skilled innovators of statescraft--the founding fathers--
struggled long and at the expense of great physical and mental energies
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trying to analyze and anticipate the divergent multilinear character¬
istics of man and his relationship to society before they emerged with
O
the Constitution. A most notable concept of that era was coined by
Thomas Jefferson "unalienable rights."^ These rights as depicted by
Jefferson sought to guard the individual citizen against the con¬
sequences of unbridled passions, unchecked power or the tyranny of the
majority or minority,^® If political representative changes are to be
accepted, it appears that they must supplant defective ideas of repre¬
sentation; be anchored in truth; and have some majority acceptable
moral bases.
In spite of the shortcomings of representative democracy,
there have been virtues. The ideas of individual freedom and
responsibility have had their moments of triumph. America, as a whole
and states specifically, in light of current statistics, have never
enjoyed an over-all higher standard of living. We are told via our
leaders and the annals of history that "we've never had it so good."
Upon analyzing the states in terms of future urban-rural or
city-county coalitions or anticipated future alignments of power, a
common denominator for all states and associations of power is diffi¬
cult if not impossible to achieve. However, it is possible and
factually correct to assume that the largest population category of
^David G. Smith, The Convention and The Constitution (New York:




counties in a state includes that most urban counties and that the
smallest includes the most rural. Throughout this thesis the author
has shown the mathematical inequities that have existed between voter-
value in rural versus urban counties. What has been particularly
evident in these studies are the ever-widening gap in almost all states
between rural and urban counties in the value of the vote. These dis¬
parities are most-noted in the literature from the year 1910 hence.
When urban counties have progressed to a point where their under¬
representation is no longer extremely severe, rural counties in most
cases are more overrepresented than ever and continue to hold more
political power than the number of their inhabitants would justify.
Table 1 on the next page shows the relative degrees of change of state
legislatures since 1962.
The bases of apportionment used by states are: population,
weighted population ratios, combination of population and areas,
minimum allocation to areas, variable allocation to areas, maximum
12
allocation to areas and constitutional allocation to areas. The
research shows the comparative differences in the value of one vote in
the smallest Congressional District of a state as compared to one vote
in the largest Congressional District of the same state. The relative
value of citizens' votes for state legislatures are shown for added
insight. It takes into consideration the population quantity of
^^Glendon Schubert, Reapportionment (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1965), pp. 11-16.
^^Ibid.. pp. 25-26.
TABLE 1
EXTENT OF LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT MAKING USE OF THE





Reapportionment with Federally- Failure to unchallenged in
(both houses) approved plans reapportion the Courts
Ore. Utah Ariz. N. D. N. C. - Category 3
Mass. Wash. Ark. Pa. S. C. - Category 3
Wise. Gel • Calif. R. I. Me. Category 3
Ky. S. D. Dele. S. C. Ore. - Category 1
Va. Conn. Fla. Tenn. S. D. - Category 2
W. Va. N. H. Idaho Texas













Table compiled by the author
1966, p. 208.
is based on statistics given in the Reader * s
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counties, number of counties in a population category and percentage of
national population. The writer shows in a chart on the previous page
patterns of legislative reapportionment via the one man--one vote
yardstick. It shows those who have undergone revisions in both houses
that are acceptable to the Courts; those who have undergone changes
acceptable to the Courts in one house; and those who have not undergone
any reapportionment since Baker v. Carr, 1962.
Where the changes made in response to the 1960 census in just
one house have been minor, there is little likelihood of any net
improvement in the over-all situation on legislative representation
without strict enforcement. Conclusions of a final nature, out of
necessity, must await additional scholarly studies and computations
reminiscent of the legislative action or inaction of the states in
the wake of recent court mandates. Until this time, the above
generalizations can, at best be only tentative. It has been the attempt
of this thesis to focus on the issues and personalities that have had
most profound bearing on; man in his perrenial quest for good govern¬
ment; State Legislative reapportionment; and the one man—one vote
political philosophy. As in the case of Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka, Kansas, a revolution has been started by a Supreme Court
Decision. A similar situation has occurred with the Court's rulings
in Reynolds v. Sims. A new revolution is still in the making. We are
a part of this continuing revolution.
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